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In October 2004, gas companies and residents of Dooralong,
Autstralia met at a public meeting to discuss coalbed methane
("CBM")' development in the Dooralong and Yarmalong Valleys of
Australia.2 Local residents came to this meeting intent against
CBM development. They feared that "gas mining [would]
contaminate surrounding land and waterways, including the
underground aquifer, and waste millions of litres of town water."3
To demonstrate the reality of CBM mining's environmental threat,
local residents produced "graphic evidence of massive
environmental damage caused by [CBM drilling] operations in
Wyoming and Montana."'
In the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, gas
drillers have been exploiting CBM resources for almost ten years,
with limited environmental review.' This CBM boom accelerated
under pressure from the Bush administration to develop all
domestic oil and gas reserves in order to limit dependence on
foreign oil.' The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") estimates
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1. "Coalbed methane is a form of natural gas found in coal seams." N. Plains
Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (D.
Mont. 2003).
2. Mark Nolan, Local Fury Over Gas Mining Plan, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Australia), Oct. 21, 2004, at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Alan C. Miller et al., White House Puts the West on Fast Track for
Oil, Gas Drilling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 18, 2001)
(establishing a task force to find ways to expedite permit review for energy-related
projects); Felicity Barringer, Bush's Record: New Priorities in Environment, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 14, 2004, at Al (describing the Bush administration's push to develop
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that oil and gas companies will drill 165,000 new wells over the
next twenty years in the Basin.7 Extracting the CBM will not
come without a cost to local populations. CBM extraction entails
"dewatering" the land, which often leaves landowners' wells dry
and exposes all Powder River Basin residents to possible water
shortages.'
Just like Australian residents, residents from the Powder
River Basin have also protested CBM development.! For several
reasons, Powder River Basin residents are fighting an uphill
battle. Most residents own only the surface estate of their land,
which leaves the mineral estate for the government. 1 The mineral
estate is the dominant estate, which legally places the reigns in
the government's hands." Because residents do not often have
vested property rights that protect their land from environmental
degradation, they have used environmental statutes to protect
their interests and to limit the negative effects of CBM drilling."
domestic oil and gas reserves from public lands, most notably the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge).
7. Theo Stein, Energy Project Draws Suit, DENVER POST, May 23, 2004, at C2.
8. N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 298 F. Supp. 2d
1017, 1020 (D. Mont. 2003) (explaining that CBM extraction involves pumping
available water from the coal seams, which also function as aquifers, thereby
reducing the water pressure and allowing the gas to move towards the wellhead for
collection).
9. Wealthy Bozeman, Montana residents rallied to postpone CBM
development in their county. Blaine Harden, In Montana, Gas Drilling Hits a Rare
Roadblock, WASH. POST, July 5, 2004, at Al. Traditionally conservative
Westerners, such as gun owners, hunters, and fishermen, went to Washington to
protest a Bush-backed energy bill that offered subsidies to CBM drillers. Mike
Sorgahan, Drilling Riles Hunters, DENVER POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A4.
10. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 870 (1999).
11. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Army Corp of Engineers, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232,
1245 (D. Wyo. 2005) (citing Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736,
741 (Wyo. 1989)).
12. Wyo. Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1245-46 (stating that "the surface
owner has no right to deny access or surface disturbance that is 'reasonably
necessary' to oil and gas production"). In addition to environmental litigation, some
property owners execute damage agreements with gas drillers. See Joshua Skov &
Nancy Myers, Easy Money, Hidden Costs: Applying Precautionary Economic
Analysis to Coalbed Methane in the Powder River Basin, Science and
Environmental Health Network, 31 (June 2004), at
http://www.sehn.org/pdf/cbm.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (describing a damage
agreement as a legal agreement drafted to "address conflict between surface rights
and CBM mineral rights"). This Article will not consider damage agreements.
Damage agreements often provide inadequate protection from environmental
degradation. The law does not require gas drillers to execute damage agreements
with property owners. Id. at 30-32. Therefore, whether property owners execute a
damage agreement rests on the property owner's legal savvy and the goodwill of the
gas driller, neither of which is guaranteed. Ted Turner provides a notable
exception to this generalization. His damage agreement with gas drillers
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This Article begins by exploring the history of the Western
split estate and by explaining more recent events that have led to
the mass exploitation of CBM resources.'3 Part I examines the
case law surrounding CBM development, which includes cases
brought under the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, and the Freedom of Information Act.' Part I concludes
by discussing how Hawaii used the public trust doctrine to ensure
conservation of its water resources in a situation similar to that in
Wyoming and Montana."8 Part II analyzes the adequacy of
statutory protection for local populations and their water
resources and argues that current protection measures are
inadequate.'6 This Article then considers the feasibility of using
the public trust doctrine to protect Western water rights.'7 In
conclusion, this Article finds that a statutory enactment of the
public trust doctrine would improve water conservation and




A. General History of the Split Estate
The Western split estate traces its roots back to the 1860s.
During that time, Congress encouraged settlement of the West by
enacting pro-settlement legislation." In both the 1862 Homestead
Act and the 1873 Coal Lands Act, Congress conveyed property to
homesteaders in fee simple absolute, 20 reserving no part of the
constrained their ability to affect negatively the water or surface of his land in a
variety of creative ways. Powder River Basin Resource Council, VERMEJO PARK
RANCH COALBED METHANE PROJECT MINERAL EXTRACTION AGREEMENT SUMMARY
at http://www.powderriverbasin.org/cbm/turners-vermejo-park..ranch.shtml (last
visited Sept. 11, 2005).
13. See infra Part L.A-B.
14. See infra Part I.D.
15. See infra Part I.E.
16. See infra Part II.A-B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862); Coal Lands Act, ch. 205 § 1,
13 Stat. 343 (1864); Coal Lands Act, ch. 279 § 1, 17 Stat. 607 (1873); Desert Land
Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877). Current versions are available at Unites States
Code, title 43, sections 32i-23.
20. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, PROPERTY, 240 (5th ed. 2002)
(describing fee simple absolute as an estate in land that "cannot be divested" and
"will not end if any event happens in the future").
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mineral estate to the United States.' Settlers could buy land
under the Homestead Act for the price of "entry and cultivation,"
while land procured under the Coal Lands Acts cost settlers about
ten to twenty dollar an acre. 2
At the turn of the twentieth century this system came under
fire. First, the West was experiencing a coal shortage, putting
pressure on the government to encourage development of Western
coal." Second, many settlers simply failed to report the existence
of coal on their lands, leaving the government with an empty
hand. 4 In response to this crisis, President Theodore Roosevelt
withdrew sixty-four million acres of public land from the
Homestead Act and the Coal Lands Act, angering many settlers
who had already begun working the land.' As a compromise,
Congress passed statutes in 1909 and 1910 allowing settlers to
remain on lands if they had already "made good-faith agricultural
entries onto tracts later identified as coal lands,"26 but subjected
that grant to "a reservation to the United States of all coal in said
lands, and the right to prospect for, mine and remove the same.""7
More than twenty million acres in the West currently exist under
this framework."
Oil and gas speculators gain access to these minerals owned
by the United States by leasing a tract of land overlaying those
resources. 9 The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act
provides that leases will be awarded to the highest bidder at an
auction."° The BLM acts as the auctioneer in this process and
decides which tracts will be open for bidding. 31
21. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868 (1999).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 869.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 870 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1988)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1988). Whether the lessee gained a strong
property right in the leased minerals is an open question. See George Cameron
Coggins & Jane Elizabeth Van Dyke, NEPA and Private Rights in Public Mineral
Resources: The Fee Complex Relative?, 20 ENVTL. L. 649, 666-70 (explaining that
property interests in leased minerals were once strong but are now dependent on
environmental review). Recent developments in the environmental review process
have lead some to characterize a lessee's interest in leased minerals as merely "an
exclusive procedural license" to mine. Id. at 670.
30. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1988).




B. The Political Push to Develop CBM
Until recently, the United States did not lay claim to its
reservation of rights to CBM in the Powder River Basin. CBM did
not become a marketable product until the 1970s;"' CBM drilling
did not become profitable until the skyrocketing gas prices of 2002-
2003.33 Recent large-scale acquisitions in the oil and gas industry
reflect the Powder River Basin's desirability. Wood MacKenzie, an
energy research firm, reported that "[t]he Rocky Mountains is fast
becoming a focal region for companies chasing growth."34 The
government refers to the Basin as a "Persian Gulf' of gas.35
The Bush administration has enthusiastically spurred the
growth and development of CBM in the Rocky Mountains.36
Within months of coming into office, President Bush issued several
executive orders to expedite oil and gas development,37 reasoning
that increased CBM production would provide a short-term
solution to a looming national energy crisis.38 After failing several
times to pass a new National Energy Policy through Congress, the
32. Bobbier Johnson, Coalbed Methane Ownership Rights in Wyoming, 8 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 46, 49 (2004).
33. Felicity Barringer, Bush's Energy Policy Lives Where the Deer and the
Antelope Play, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, § 1, at 41.
34. See, e.g., Sheila McNulty & James Politi, Pioneer Agrees to Buy Evergreen in
Dollars 2.1bn Deal US Energy Producers, FIN. TIMES (London), May 5, 2004, at 29
(reporting that oil and gas companies with gas leases in the Powder River Basin
are fast becoming a hot commodity for larger oil and gas companies seeking
growth).
35. Rocky Mountain Energy Council, White House Task Force on Energy
Project Streamlining at http://www.etf.energy.gov/pdfs/RMECWhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Sept. 20, 2005) (quoting Colorado School of Mines geologist Fred F.
Meissner).
36. See, e.g., Joby Warrick & Juliet Eilperin, Oil and Gas Hold the Reins in the
Wild West: Land-Use Decisions Largely Favor the Energy Industry, WASH. POST,
Sept. 25, 2004, at Al (original title: Old and Gas Hold the Reins in the Wild West:
Land- Use Decisions Largely Favor the Energy Industry, corrected Sept. 26, 2004, at
A2) (arguing that the Bush administration has made domestic energy development,
specifically in the Rocky Mountains, a top priority and reporting that the
Administration has "eased development restrictions" on more than sixty million
acres of public lands for purposes such as drilling).
37. See Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,355 (May 18, 2001) (requiring
agencies to explain delays in permitting energy projects to superior offices); Exec.
Order No. 13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 18, 2001) (calling for agencies to
expedite review of permits for energy-related projects and establishing an
interagency task force to streamline the process).
38. See National Energy Policy Development Group, Reliable, Affordable, and
Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future, viii (May 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (last visited Sept. 13, 2005) (describing the
current energy crisis as the worst since the oil embargoes of the 1970s, and citing
the cause as a "fundamental imbalance between supply and demand").
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Administration "moved forward with a regulatory approach."39
President Bush formed an Interagency Energy Task Force and its
regional spin-off, the Rocky Mountain Energy Council, for the sole
purpose of speeding domestic energy development." These bodies
coordinate agency decisions in order to quickly authorize energy
projects such as new gas wells.4 The Administration also created
new incentives to issue permits for new gas wells.42 Interior
Secretary Gale Norton "challenged Wyoming BLM workers to
triple the number of drilling permits approved annually, from
1,000 to 3,000 a year."43 Furthermore, the federal government
supports CBM development through subsidies.44
The federal government's encouragement of energy
development in the Rocky Mountains has worked, possibly at the
expense of careful environmental review.45 Indeed, its strategy has
vastly increased the number of wells in the Powder River Basin
and throughout the Rocky Mountains. 6
39. Craig Welch, For Good or Ill, Bush Clears Path for Energy Development,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at A22 (quoting James Connaughton, chairman of
the White House Council on Environmental Quality and the Interagency Energy
Task Force); see also id. (quoting Dave Alberswerth, former Clinton adviser) ("What
they've done, successfully, over the last 3-1/2 years is embed, in obscure documents,
some pretty dramatic changes in direction .... They haven't changed any statutes.
They haven't changed any regulations. But they've changed a whole lot of practices
and policies without any real public scrutiny.").
40. See Exec. Order No. 13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. at 28,357; White House Task
Force on Energy Project Streamlining; Public Organization Meeting of the
Proposed Rocky Mountain Energy Council, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,950 (July 31, 2003);
Skov & Myers, supra note 12, at 22.
41. Id.
42. Warrick & Eilperin, supra note 36, at A6 (describing the BLM and Interior
officials recent practice of offering "awards and incentives to field office employees
who work 'diligently' and 'creatively' to speed approval of new drilling permits").
43. Id.; cf. Welch, supra note 39 (reporting that the BLM grants more than
eighty percent of requests for waivers of seasonal drilling bans).
44. Skov & Myers, supra note 12, at 18-22 (calculating that the Powder River
Basin gas industry will save between $707 million and $1.65 billion over the next
five years due to federal tax breaks and subsidies, both direct and indirect); Mike
Soraghan, Scramble for Energy, DENVER POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al (reporting that
CBM drillers may earn a new three billion dollar tax break).
45. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 5, at A14 ("'All we do is issue permits for
oil and gas,' said a career BLM staff member in a Western office who spoke on the
condition that he not be named. 'We're told to follow new deadlines that are totally
driven by industry. We're not given time to do adequate [environmental reviews]
and to consider the consequences of our decisions.'").
46. Stein, supra note 7 and accompanying text; Welch, supra note 39 ("[Tlhe
number of new oil and natural-gas drilling permits yearly on federal lands under
President Bush is [sixty] percent higher than it was under President Clinton.");
Editorial, Powder River Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 4, at 12 ("The
administration's plans for the basin are breathtakingly ambitious. It aims to sink
51,000 coal bed methane wells in Wyoming over 10 years, and 26,000 more in
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C. The Environmental Impacts of CBM Drilling
Drilling CBM wells comes at a heavy cost to surface estate
owners with CBM wells on their land and to entire populations in
the Powder River Basin. When an oil company extracts CBM from
the ground, it also extracts equal or greater amounts of water.47 A
technical report prepared for a Montana EIS found that CBM
development placed numerous private, public, and irrigation wells
at risk of "drawdown."5 Even wells near but outside of a CBM
field are subject to drawdown. 9 The arid climate of the Powder
River Basin amplifies this threat of depleting limited water
supplies. ° The Montana BLM acknowledges that springs and
wells throughout Southeastern Montana will dry up within the
next twenty years, meaning that "agriculture . . . or CBM
development [will] need to be limited."5  The Montana
Department of Natural Resources concluded that CBM drilling
could reduce water levels in targeted aquifers for long periods of
time.5 '
Aside from depleting groundwater, CBM extraction also
threatens surface water. For ranchers, this means endangering
irrigation supplies as well as drinking water.53 CBM threatens
surface water because CBM wastewater often contains salts and
metals "that can degrade soil and kill irrigated crops and native
plants."" CBM wells can also directly pollute rivers, lakes, or
Montana.").
47. See Brief for Appellant, N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., No. 04-35002 (D. Mont. March 30, 2004) (explaining that the Montana BLM
estimates that CBM drillers will extract fifty-eight billion cubic feet of water over
the next twenty years); see also Skov & Myers, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that as
much as eleven trillion gallons of water could be lost "if current expansions are
carried out").
48. J. Daniel Arthur et al., Coal Bed Methane in the Powder River Basin of
Montana, 17-18, http://www.all-llc.com/CBM/cbmtechnicalreport.pdf.
49. See id. at 17.
50. See, e.g., Blaine Harden & Douglas Jehl, Ranchers Bristle as Gas Wells
Loom on the Range, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at 22 (noting that the Powder River
Basin is "an arid region prone to persistent drought").
51. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 5 (quoting a report from the Montana
BLM).
52. Id.; see also Skov & Myers, supra note 12, at 3 (quoting that an estimated
5,000 groundwater wells could go dry "as the water table drops up to 600 ft. in
CBM extraction regions"); Harden & Jehl, supra note 50, at 1 (reporting on one
rancher who already hauls in water because CBM drillers depleted the property's
well).
53. See Miller et al., supra note 5, at A14 ("Ranchers in the Powder River area.
have complained that drinking water from their wells has been fouled .... ").
54. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 5; see also N. Plains Res. Council, Inc.
v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
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wells when methane escapes into water or soil rather than into the
wellhead itself." Despite the existence of an Interagency Task
Force to coordinate agency decisions, the permitting agencies have
required very little environmental review of drilling projects. 5' In
fact, most evidence suggests that the government proceeded
without considering the environmental effects"7 and that it has
used any and all means to accelerate gas extraction."" Over the
past few years, the Administration has struggled with the EPA
over the ability to use hydraulic fracturing, a practice of injecting
high pressure fluids into the ground to fracture rocks containing
CBM or natural gas in order to gain access to the resource.6
Economic benefits of CBM extraction partially counter the
environmental degradation of mining.6°  Because of CBM
extraction and high gas prices, Wyoming currently has the "largest
surplus in the nation as a percent of budget" and expects to collect
$1.2 billion more in tax revenues than previously projected."
Regardless of this surplus, it is unclear if the money will have a
long-term impact on Wyoming's welfare, or if it will improve the
CBM wastewater is a pollutant under the Clean Water Act).
55. See, e.g., Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1247, 1261 (D. Wyo. 2002)
(finding that sufficient facts were alleged in a claim charging that the discharge of
CBM wastewater into a local creek destroyed water for irrigation purposes and
surrounding land); Harden & Jehl, supra note 50, at 1 (describing that the Bell
Fourche River "bubbles like champagne" as it travels through ranchland dotted
with gas wells).
56. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 5, at A12 (using interviews with BLM
workers to describe the deterioration of the environmental review process).
57. See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1158
(10th Cir. 2004) (pointing out that the BLM ignored evidence that "existing NEPA
analyses were not adequate to address the impacts of CBM development" and that
CBM production threatened groundwater more than typical oil and gas wells).
58. See Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, A Changing Landscape: Haliburton's
Interests Assisted by the White House, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at Al (reporting
that the Bush administration advocated for environmental acceptance of hydraulic
fracturing, a drilling technique that increases gas production, despite the fact that
the EPA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Eleventh Circuit have limited its
use); Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, Investigation of Drilling Regulations is
Urged, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A15 (reporting that "five members of Congress
called ... for investigations into the Bush [a]dministration's regulation of hydraulic
fracturing, an oil and gas drilling practice pioneered by Haliburton").
59. Hamburger & Miller, Investigation of Drilling Regulations is Urged, supra
note 58, at A25 (reporting that a June 2004 EPA report sanctioning hydraulic
fracturing for CBM drilling triggered attacks from EPA insiders including a
whistleblower who stated that hydraulic fracturing posed a danger to public health
and safety).
60. See Arthur et al., supra note 48, at 16 (noting that CBM development
should stimulate the Montana economy).
61. Kirk Johnson, Energy Boom Has Wyoming Coffers Overflowing, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A16.
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standard of living of individual citizens. 2 Typically in Western
energy booms, the money dries up shortly after the coal or oil is
extracted, leaving locals with few long-term benefits.63  One
Wyoming economist explained that during boom periods towns
typically expand services for the community.6 Then, during bust
periods, towns can no longer afford these services (such as health
insurance or retirement benefits for county employees) and
politicians "are caught in a struggle to maintain services while
facing a continuously shrinking budget."
65
Recently, one hundred Western economists wrote to
President Bush and the Western governors with this concern in
mind.66  The economists warned that leaders should not invest
heavily in extractive industries because extractive industries
degrade the environment, and the environment is necessary for
economic prosperity in the West. 7 Economists warned that these
industries have a limited ability to create new jobs and increase
local incomes.8
D. Cases Brought by Powder River Basin Residents
Addressing CBM Development's Environmental Issues
Most case law surrounding CBM reflects the struggle
between landowners and oil companies to determine ownership of
CBM gas.69 Comparatively few cases actually wrestle with issues
62. See Skov & Myers, supra note 12, at i (noting that oil and gas companies
from outside of Montana and Wyoming, with no vested interest in the area, are
reaping the profits); McNulty & Politi, supra note 34, at 29 (describing the
exploitation of CBM by international conglomerates). In a recent memorandum to
the Montana BLM, a consulting company described the Montana portion of the
Basin as a rural, agricultural area that overlaps areas with significant minority
populations, three Indian reservations, and counties with elevated poverty levels.
Arthur et al., supra note 48, at 15. The Wyoming portion of the Basin is also
primarily rural and agricultural, with a total population of 38,436, or eight percent
of Wyoming's total population. Memorandum from Watts and Associates, Inc. to
Wyoming Water Development Commission (February 2002),
http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/powder/techmemos/popproj.pdf.
63. See Johnson, supra note 61, at A16 (describing past, short-lived booms in
Wyoming).
64. James G. Thomson & Douglas Bryant, Fiscal Impact in a Western
Boomtown: Unmet Expectations, 3 IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULLETIN 3, 18-19 (1992).
65. Id. at 19.
66. A Letter from Economists to President Bush and the Governors of Eleven
Western States Regarding the Economic Importance of the West's Natural Resources
(Dec. 3, 2003) (Ed Whitelaw, ed.), http://www.econw.com/pdf/12303.pdf
67. Id. at 2.
68. See id. ("[I]f a community's natural environment is degraded, it has greater
difficulty retaining and attracting workers and firms.").
69. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873-79
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of environmental damage or surface owners' rights, possibly
reflecting the lack of accessible statutory protection.0
1. Cases Brought Under the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act 7' ("CWA") sets water quality standards
with the goal of preserving American waters for beneficial uses.
7
'
For example, it sets a maximum amount of pollution that can be
discharged into waters and expressly protects surface waters from
excess pollution.7 Nonetheless, the CWA does not unequivocally
protect groundwater from either pollution74 or excessive pumping.5
Instead, state laws separately govern the use of groundwater. For
example, Wyoming requires gas drillers to apply for permits before
dewatering CBM wells 5 and Montana has declared the Powder
River Basin to be a "controlled groundwater area," which requires
CBM operators to propose mitigation measures for damage, among
other things.7
When agencies fail to enforce the CWA, citizens can file
751claims under the CWA's "citizen suit" provision, which is
(1999) (addressing CBM ownership within federal coal seams); Johnson, supra note
32, at 46, 49 ("[The primary legal controversy involving CBM is the ownership of
gas.... ").
70. See infra Parts I.D.1-3 (describing six cases that delve into environmental
issues and surface owner rights).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972) (amended 1977, renumbered 1987).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2004).
73. See Gary Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development in the Intermountain West:
Producing Energy and Protecting Water, 4 WYO. L. REV. 541, 547 (2004).
74. Thomas D. Marks, Toward a National Groundwater and Future Courses of
Action, 61 FLA. B.J. 10, 11-12 (1986) ("EPA has neither established the
groundwater quality 'criteria' or 'information' mandated in § 304(a), nor has it
sought to regulate groundwater quality at the federal level or to require it at the
state level. Ion [sic) addition, EPA has rejected the idea of requiring National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under 33 U.S.C. § 1342
for groundwater pollution activities, citing 'substantial legal problems' in applying
the system. Therefore, the Clean Water Act, as presently interpreted and enforced,
is insufficient to protect groundwater resources.").
75. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2004) (refraining from explicit regulation of
groundwater).
76. Wyo. SWAT. ANN. § 41-3-905 (2004).
77. Mont. Department of Natural Resources, Final Order In the Matter of the
Designation of the Powder River Basin Controlled Groundwater Area (1999),
http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/final%20order.htm.
78. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1972) (amended 1987); Leonard 0. Townsend,
Hey You, Get Off [of] My Cloud: An Analysis of Citizen Suit Preclusions Under the
Clean Water Act, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.R. 75, 77-78 (1999) ("[T]he 'Citizen Suit'
provision allows private citizens to initiate proceedings against a violator or against
the Administrator if the Administrator fails to perform his statutory duties. The
provision for citizen suits is not unique to the CWA; it is found in various forms
within many statutes having environmental significance.").
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intended to play second fiddle to "agency enforcement."' 9 In the
Powder River Basin, plaintiffs successfully used the CWA to
protect themselves against inappropriate discharge of CBM
wastewater." In Swartz v. Beach,8 1 the plaintiff, a rancher
downstream from a CBM operation, brought suit alleging
violations of the CWA and both physical and regulatory takings of
his land."2 Swartz originally brought suit because wastewater
from a CBM operation flowed downstream to his land where it
"caused permanent soil damage because of the elevated salinity
and sodium absorption ratio."83 The CBM operation used so much
water that it decreased the stream flow in Wildcat Creek, his main
source of irrigation water." Consequently, Swartz did not irrigate
his hay meadows in 2000 or 2001 because of either lack of water or
degraded water quality.85
The Tenth Circuit found that Swartz alleged "sufficient facts
to state a claim for a physical and regulatory taking and those
claims [were] ripe for review."86  The court found that the
defendants' discharge of wastewater onto Swartz's ranch would
amount to constructive possession of Swartz's land, thereby
fulfilling the requirements of a physical taking.87  In the
alternative, the court found the plaintiffs claim alleging a
regulatory taking valid because there were sufficient facts alleging
that the defendants destroyed economically viable uses of the land
by "failing to enforce federal and state laws"8 and that their
inaction "failed to advance a legitimate government interest." 9
Both the physical and regulatory taking of Swartz's ranch
79. Townsend, supra note 78, at 92 ("[T]he legislative history of citizen suits
notes that 'the great volume of enforcement actions [are intended to] be brought by
the State and that citizen suits are proper only if the Federal, State, and local
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility.' Thus, a claimed lack of
diligence must rise to the level of a catastrophic failure by the governing agency for
a citizen-plaintiff to defeat preclusion based only on the diligence prong under the
CWA.").
80. See N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding CBM wastewater a pollutant under the
CWA).
81. 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002).
82. Id. at 1240.
83. Id. at 1248.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1267.
87. Id. at 1261.




stemmed from the government's failure to enforce the CWA.90 The
finding for Swartz entitled him to just compensation for the land
taken by the government.9' However, this finding did not
guarantee the eradication of pollution or the rehabilitation of his
land.
92
A recent case in Wyoming also resolved a dispute over the
validity of a permit issued under the CWA, this time to discharge
"dredge and fill material," which is used to contain the produced
CBM water in reservoirs.9 The Army Corps of Engineers issued a
general permit allowing gas drillers to discharge "dredge and fill
material" throughout the entire region.94 Such a permit can be
granted only after the agency determines that the permit will
result in only minimal environmental damage.9 In this case, the
court found that the Army Corps of Engineers failed to consider
the effects the permit would have on aquatic life, in violation of its
own guidelines." This failure resulted in a violation of the CWA,
which allows for a general permit only if it will have a minimal
cumulative adverse effect on the environment."9
The facts of Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Fidelity
Exploration and Development Co.9 replayed the same basic facts of
Swartz.99  In Fidelity, the defendant discharged "unaltered
groundwater produced in association with gas extraction"'° into
Montana's Tongue River and Squirrel Creek, thereby destroying
the downstream water for irrigation. The Ninth Circuit found this
CBM wastewater to be a pollutant within the meaning of the
CWA"'0 and the cause of the Tongue River's pollution.''
While these rulings require CBM producers to comply with
90. Id. at 1261-62.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation").
92. See Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 700 (La. 2003) ("The citizens of
this state are better served by having an expert regulatory agency enforce the
environmental statutes rather than waiting for the private citizen to bring
individual actions for damages and restoration, which are no guarantee that the
pollution will be eradicated.").
93. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Army Corps of Engineers, 351 F. Supp. 2d. 1232,
1237 (D. Wyo. 2005).
94. Id.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2001).
96. Wyo. Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. 2d. at 1257.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1).
98. 325 F.3d 1155, 1155-60 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. See id. at 1158-60.
100. Id. at 1157-58.
101. Id. at 1157.
102. Id. at 1162.
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the CWA, they do not mean that CBM producers can no longer
discharge CBM wastewater into streams. °3 Rather, these rulings
mean CBM producers will need to obtain a National Pollution
Discharge System (NPDES) permit if they trigger the CWA (by
discharging a pollutant into a stream, drainage, or a storage
pond).' A CBM producer can acquire the NPDES permit from the
EPA.1°5
2. Cases Brought Under the National Environmental Policy
Act
Both Wyoming and Montana plaintiffs have used the
National Environmental Policy Act 10 6 ("NEPA") to challenge
agency decisions expanding CBM development. 7 NEPA requires
that an agency such as the BLM take a "hard look" at
environmental impacts before deciding upon a course of action.0 8
The agency can satisfy the "hard look" requirement by performing
proper environmental review of a project before making a
decision.0 9
People who are concerned with CBM development in the
Powder River Basin question whether the BLM really gave CBM's
environmental effects a "hard look.""0  BLM officers in both
Wyoming and Montana claimed to satisfy NEPA's requirements by
basing their CBM expansion decisions on various environmental
impact statements ("EISs") or resource management plans created
between 1984 and 1999." However, these studies were all
103. See Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential,
State and Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
23-24 (2004) (explaining the process by which CBM producers may request permits
allowing them to continue the discharge of CBM wastewater).
104. See id. (emphasizing that the increased regulatory burdens present a mess
of red tape for CBM producers).
105. Fidelity, 325 F.3d at 1159.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2000).
107. See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 377 F.3d 1147 (10th
Cir. 2004); N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 298 F. Supp.
2d 1017 (D. Mont. 2003).
108. Pennaco, 377 F.3d at 1150 (describing that the "hard look" test "does not
impose substantive limits on agency conduct" and allows agencies substantial
freedom in deciding whether to prepare an EIS and in actual preparation and
interpretation of an EIS).
109. Id.
110. See id.; N. Plains Res. Council, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
111. Pennaco, 377 F.3d at 1152 (noting that the manager of the Buffalo BLM
office concluded that two existing EISs from 1985 and 1999 satisfied the NEPA
requirements); N. Plains Res. Council, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (stating that the
Montana BLM based its decision to permit eleven CBM wells on a 1994 EIS that
the BLM itself considered possibly inadequate).
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conducted before CBM drilling became prevalent in the Powder
River Basin and did not consider CBM drilling's impacts
separately from impacts caused by other oil and gas drilling."
2
Because common oil and gas drilling do not require extensive mine
dewatering, they do not threaten water as much as CBM
drilling.13 Thus, oil and gas studies do not give BLM officials a
thorough enough understanding of CBM drilling.
In Pennaco v. United States Department of the Interior,"' the
Tenth Circuit held that CBM development posed unique hazards
to both air and water and that previous environmental review (the
1984 and 1999 studies) was not sufficient."' Consequently, the
court upheld an Interior Board of Land Appeals decision, which
required the BLM to perform supplementary EISs before
auctioning more oil and gas leases."' This decision ensures that
the BLM will at least formally consider CBM drilling's impacts on
water before expanding CBM operations in Wyoming."' The
Wyoming Outdoor Council court followed the precedent set by
Pennaco when it invalidated a general permit that failed to comply
with NEPA."' It held that the permit could not possibly comply
with NEPA because the Army Corps of Engineers did not evaluate
the cumulative impacts of the general permit it issued for the
discharge of dredge and fill material."'
In Montana, the BLM found more support for its permitting
decisions. In Northern Plains Resource Council u. U.S. Bureau of
Land Management,"' a Montana district court held that the BLM
"was not required to perform a new EIS prior to issuing the oil and
gas leases, nor was it required to halt issuance of the leases
pending completion""' of an EIS underway at the time of decision.
At the time this Article was written, four lawsuits were pending in
the Montana district courts questioning the sufficiency of the most
recent EIS conducted by the oil and gas industry. 1  Plaintiffs
112. N. Plains Res. Council, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21; Pennaco, 377 F.3d at
1153 (noting CBM drilling's profound effects on water and air quality).
113. Pennaco, 377 F.3d at 1158.
114. Id. at 1147.
115. Id. at 1159.
116. Id. at 1150.
117. Id. at 1153-54.
118. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Army Corps of Engineers, 351 F. Supp. 2d. 1232,
1242 (D. Wyo. 2005) (writing that the permit must reflect consideration of the
cumulative impacts to the "natural and physical environment").
119. Id. at 1243.
120. 298 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Mont. 2003).
121. Id. at 1024.
122. Id. at 1021-22 n.5.
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brought these suits under the Administrative Procedure Act's
general standing authorization, 12 since NEPA does not contain a
specific citizen suit provision, as does the CWA. However, after
the Supreme Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
1 24
plaintiffs have found it more difficult to obtain standing."5 With
more difficulty establishing standing, plaintiffs cannot easily
challenge agency decisions. 26
3. Cases Brought Under the Freedom of Information Act
Environmental groups have also used the Freedom of
Information Act 127 ("FOIA") as a tool to protect the Powder River
Basin from opaque political processes and arguably negative
political decisions. One recent FOIA request resulted in
protracted litigation surrounding CBM development. 28 The FOIA
claim alleged that Deputy Secretary of the Interior Stephen J.
Griles failed to keep his private interests separate from his public
duties.' 9 As Deputy Secretary of the Interior, "Griles is
responsible for managing public lands, including approximately
seven hundred million acres of subsurface mineral rights."'3
Griles' former positions as an executive for three separate energy
companies and his continued communications with these
companies triggered suspicion that he did not make impartial
decisions about management of public lands with regard to oil and
gas leases.' Griles' criticism of an Environmental Protection
Agency EIS that ranked CBM production as an environmental
hazard raised hackles in the environmental community.13'
After the Department of the Interior ("DOI") and the Office of
Government Ethics refused to comply fully with plaintiffs' request
for documents pertaining to Griles' financial dealings with his
former employers, the plaintiffs filed suit.'33 They achieved a
123. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005).
124. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
125. In Lujan, the Court reinforced the requirement that plaintiffs experience an
imminent and concrete injury. Id. at 560; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPALL
2d § 4:14 (2004).
126. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
128. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2004).
129. Id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 5-6.
132. Id. at 5-7.
133. Id. at 7.
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limited victory when the D.C. Circuit ordered the defendants to
consent to a more thorough search and to forward the
plaintiffs' FOIA request to the higher-up offices.14 This decision
gave plaintiffs easier access to documents that could clarify the
DOI's decision-making process, but did not produce any
substantive change in CBM policy.''
E. People Facing Similar Environmental Troubles Have
Found Shelter in the Courts and in the Law
The island of Oahu provided the setting for a struggle over
water resources similar to the one in the Powder River Basin. In
In re Water Use Permit Applications 36 (Waiahole), Hawaiian sugar
farmers, and some others, were watering their sugar crops with a
combination of ground and surface water that nineteenth century
sugar growers had channeled from Oahu's Ko'olau Mountain
Range to the island's dry central plain. 37 This diversion of water
minimized the ability of local streams to support aquatic life and
was suspected of destroying local fisheries. 35 Consequently, the
Hawaii Commission on Water Resources limited the amount of
water available for private use, thereby sparking a dispute. 3'
The Hawaii Supreme Court resolved this dispute by looking
to the public trust doctrine, which Hawaiians voted to include
within the Hawaii Constitution in 1978.' The public trust-based
provisions provide that "[flor the benefit of present and future
generations, the state shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural
beauty and all natural resources.., including water."''
This Hawaiian innovation derived from a majority opinion by
Justice Field in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.11 Justice
Field stated that "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested.., so as to
134. Id. at 23.
135. Id.
136. 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
137. Id. at 423.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See C. Ede, He Kanawai Pono no ka Wai (A Just Law for Water): The
Application and Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine in In re Water Use
Permit Applications, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283, 291 (2002).
141. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (2003); see HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (2003)
(providing specifically for preservation of water resources).
142. 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding that the state could not relinquish its interest




leave them entirely under the use and control of private
parties... than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of peace."43
The public trust doctrine languished quietly on the pages of Field's
opinion until 1970 when a popular article by Joseph Sax brought it
to life once again,4 arguing for its use "as a general weapon for
the budding environmental movement."
1 4 5
Following Sax's article, the public trust doctrine emerged as a
useful tool in several environmental disputes. Probably the most
notable case relying on the public trust doctrine is National
Audobon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,46 more
commonly known as the "Mono Lake" case. Just like the courts in
Oahu and the Powder River Basin, the Mono Lake court
confronted a dispute over water allocation. The court resolved the
dispute by limiting private rights to the water and held that a
party cannot "acquir[e] a vested right to appropriate water in a
manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust."
1 47
In applying the public trust doctrine to the Oahu water
dispute, the Hawaii Supreme Court protected its state's water
resources and the Hawaiian public by holding that the public trust
doctrine protected all of Hawaii's water, including ground and
surface water. This holding represents the first and only time the
judiciary utilized the public trust doctrine to protect groundwater
resources.•4 8  "The Waiahole [c]ourt articulated three valid
purposes for the public trust: 1) the protection of water resources,
including maintenance of waters in their natural state ... ; 2) the
protection of domestic uses, particularly the provision of drinking
water; and 3) the protection of Native Hawaiian and traditional
and customary uses." 49 The court emphasized that while there are
some "examples generally demonstrat[ing] that the public trust
may allow grants of private interests in trust resources under
certain circumstances, they in no way establish private
143. Id. at 453.
144. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
145. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
799, 806 (2004).
146. 658 P.2d 709 (1983).
147. Id. at 727.
148. Joseph Sax commented that the Waiahole decision was unique because it
applied the public trust doctrine to domestic uses, ground water, and native use.
Denise E. Antolini, Water Rights and Responsibilities in the Twenty-First Century,
24 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
149. Ede, supra note 138, at 295.
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commercial use as among the public purposes protected by the
trust.,"" °
The Hawaii court relied partially on the Mono Lake decision
in deciding how to balance consumptive uses and conservation of
water within the framework of the public trust doctrine. ' 51 In
particular, it followed California's lead in stating that water rights
would not be granted "to the detriment of public trust purposes.""'
As a practical matter, the court endowed the Commission on
Water Resource Management with the power to weigh "competing
public and private water uses on a case-by-case basis,""' granting
permits when appropriate. To inform the Commission's
permitting decisions, the court supported creating minimum
instream flow standards14 to "prescrib[e] responsible limits to the
development and use of public water resources""' and supported
leaving more water to instream uses than conservative estimates
would warrant."' The court also explained how to prioritize water
use under the public trust doctrine. It stated that private
commercial water uses warrant a higher level of scrutiny than
other uses."7  The most important uses of the water included
preservation of the stream, providing water for people to drink,
and protecting Native Hawaiian uses."8
On a critical note, the public trust doctrine imparts an
impractical, utopian feeling that sometimes undermines its
usefulness."' The doctrine's ambiguity often does not lend itself to
clear practical solutions to environmental problems.'6 ' Some have
150. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 450 (Haw.
2000).
151. Id. at 453.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 454.
154. Id. at 459 n.48 (defining "'instream flow standard' as 'a quantity or flow of
water or depth of water which is required to be present at a specific location in a
stream system at certain specified times of the year to protect fishery, wildlife,
recreational, aesthetic, scenic, and other beneficial instream uses'").
155. Id. at 460-61 (explaining that instream flow standards ensure protection of
water supplies and avoide an "ad hoc planning process driven by immediate
demands").
156. Id. at 459 (explaining that some water would be reserved as a groundwater
buffer and as an agricultural reserve).
157. Id. 454. The court also explained that the burden to justify commercial uses
should ultimately lie with a party seeking to engage in such use. Id.
158. Ede, supra note 140, at 295.
159. Ede, supra note 140, at 298; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 145, at
806 (discussing Justice Field's lifelong ideological support of the public interest
against private influence groups).
160. Ede, supra note 140, at 298-303.
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criticized the Waiahole decision for such ambiguities. 6' For
example, one critic of the Waiahole court wrote that the decision
"did not adequately explain how to balance the three purposes of
the [public trust doctrine]" and that the court's reliance on
instream flow requirements as a basis for water allocation
decisions created a dilemma because no instream flow
measurement standards exist.'6' Regardless of such criticisms, the
public trust doctrine has proven to be workable in California
following the Mono Lake decision. Jan Stevens, advisor to
California on water allocation following Mono Lake, "suggested
that the legal complexities of the public trust doctrine are
formidable but not insurmountable, and that California courts and
agencies have been able to consider the impacts of water allocation
decisions on public trust values."'63
II. Analysis of the Adequacy of Environmental Review in
the Powder River Basin
A. Local Populations' Lack of Political Clout Relative to Gas
Drillers Limits Their Ability to Protect Their Interests
When it comes to CBM drilling in the Powder River Basin,
political decisions unabashedly favor gas interests over those of
property owners in the Basin. President Bush and Vice President
Cheney earned their fortunes in the oil and gas industry and their
oil and gas connections materialized in administrative
appointments, such as that of Stephen J. Griles.' The
Administration's energy policies push production of domestic
energy, particularly from the Rocky Mountains and Alaska, 6' and
reflect a preference for gas production over environmental review
161. See id. at 298-99.
162. Id .at 298-303. Hawaii did not already have instream flow standards
because stream depths had never been measured before the creation of the
Waiahole Ditch system. Id. However, instream flow standards are typically
available. Id. For example, instream flow measurements are commonly used to
classify streams in most watersheds. KENNETH BROOKS ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF WATERSHEDS 242 (3d ed. 2003) (describing widespread
methods for studying and classifying streams that require measurement of stream
depth); see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-401 (2003) (illustrating an example of a
water rights agreement in Montana using instream flow measurements to
determine water rights).
163. Antolini, supra note 148, at 8.
164. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C.
2004).
165. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (presenting an overview of
the recent rush to develop energy resources).
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and public health.'66 The Energy Task Force, under Vice President
Cheney, advanced this set of priorities by promoting the practice of
hydraulic fracturing, which increases gas production and profits
while endangering public water supplies.'67 Under President
Bush's direction, the Administration opened more public lands
than ever before for oil and gas exploration. 6' Oil and gas
subsidies, tax breaks, and research subsidies pushed the
development even further, making CBM drilling economically
feasible for industry."
Surface owners in the Basin became the political losers in the
gas drilling frenzy. "  Oil and gas companies, backed by
government subsidies and tax breaks, earned profits but brought
relatively few jobs to the Powder River Basin.'7' This is not
surprising considering the political vulnerability of the Powder
River Basin population in comparison to the oil and gas
industry. 7' The Basin itself contains relatively high populations of
minorities and people in poverty and rests in two states that
muster only six electoral votes in combination. 7' Towns dot the
Powder River Basin even less generously than they do in the rest
of the region and ranching is a common occupation.' The Powder
River Basin simply does not have any political capital to spend.
CBM expansion not only compromises the natural
environment of the Powder River Basin, it also exacerbates an
inequity between gas giants and farmers, ranchers, and common
citizens.'7' While bringing extractive industries into the Basin
brings immediate economic benefits, such as huge budget
surpluses and cash to spend on new socially-beneficial programs,
past energy booms have been followed by busts where the tax
money and people flow out of the economy as fast as they came. " 6
166. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Contra, Exec. Order No.
13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 18, 2001) (specifying that the Administration
aimed to accelerate energy production while maintaining safety and public health).
167. Supra note 58 and accompanying text.
168. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part L.B-C.
171. Supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
172. Cf supra Part I.B (explaining the political push to develop CBM in
Washington); supra note 62 (describing the population as a group typically
underrepresented in national politics).
173. Supra note 62.
174. Supra note 62.
175. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (explaining that economic
benefits will ultimately settle with big business and not local populations).
176. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (explaining the boom and
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Not only do energy booms leave towns with fleeting economic
benefits, they also compromise the area's ability to initiate new
economic growth.'77 Past Western energy booms have left counties
struggling to fund and maintain programs and infrastructure they
can no longer afford. 7 8 Extractive energy booms cause an even
more fundamental problem because resource extraction
compromises the environment, which many Western economists
argue is the West's most important resource for sustaining
agriculture, attracting new businesses and population, and
generally growing the economy. "'
This situation presents a classic violation of the public trust
doctrine as framed by Justice Field in 1892: the Administration
has "abdicate[d] its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested ... so as to leave [the property] entirely under the
use and control of private parties . ,,18o In this case, the federal
government granted private oil and gas companies easy access to
CBM and natural gas at the expense of private landowners and
local water supplies,"' much like the Illinois state legislature
granted the Illinois Central Railroad access to the Chicago Harbor
in the classic public trust case, Illinois Central.8' In its effort to
speed up the permitting process, the government hampered
careful environmental review that should ensure gas wells do not
negatively affect the surrounding environment.'83 Granting favors
to gas companies and waivers of normal restrictive procedures has
become standard practice."' In its role as trustee of our natural
resources, the government encouraged exploitation of gas at the
expense of water, an essential resource for life.' Existing statutes
and regulations do not provide an adequate remedy for this
inequity.' 8
bust of Western energy development spurts).
177. Supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
178. Supra note 64.
179. Supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
180. I1. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
181. See supra notes 6, 37, 46 and accompanying text (noting the increase of
land available for oil and gas drilling); see also supra Part I.C. (detailing the
environmental impacts of CBM development).
182. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part I.B (describing the federal government's push to develop
CBM, the subsequent increase in CBM wells, and the sloppiness of the
environmental review process).
184. See supra notes 42-44 (describing the procedural latitude given to oil and
gas companies).
185. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part I.C.
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B. Powder River Basin Residents Do Not Have Adequate
Protection from CBM Drilling
1. The Clean Water Act is Good, but Not Good Enough
Given current statutory options, the CWA presents the best
protection for Powder River Basin residents faced with CBM-
derived water pollution. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Fidelity
requires that gas drillers acquire an NPDES permit before
disposing of CBM wastewater in Montana waters."' If enforced,
this holding will prevent pollution of surface water in Montana.'8 8
If authorities fail to enforce the CWA, aggrieved citizens can file
claims under the CWA's citizen suit provision, '89 as the plaintiffs
did in Swartz, Fidelity, and Wyoming Outdoor Council.9 °
Notwithstanding the CWA's benefits, it presents some
significant inadequacies for Powder River Basin plaintiffs. First, a
citizen suit can be brought only after gas drillers discharge
pollutants into the water.' 9' Thus, the damage is done before a
citizen can take action. For example, Wildcat Creek intermittently
ran dry or contained highly polluted water before Swartz brought
suit." Fidelity Exploration polluted the Tongue River before
plaintiffs could bring suit.9
Swartz's takings clause claim also failed to prevent pollution.
Establishing a constitutional taking entitled Swartz to receive
compensation only for his damaged land. '94 Compensation,
however, cannot restore polluted land to its former level of
quality."' Depending on the level and type of damage, money
presents an inadequate or limited solution to land and water
rehabilitation.' 6 Given that Swartz and many other Powder River
Basin residents ranch for a living, soil and water quality form the
basis for their livelihoods and, consequently, intensify their
187. See N. Plains. Res. Council, Inc. v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1159, 1165 (explaining that the CWA required an NPDES permit for
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters and holding that CBM-produced
water is a pollutant).
188. See id. at 1158-59 (distinguishing CBM water from river water and
characterizing CBM water's effect on surface water).
189. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
192. Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d. 1239, 1248-49 (D. Wyo. 2002).
193. Fidelity, 325 F.3d at 1158.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
195. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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personal stake in environmental injuries. 197
Citizen suits will never prevent environmental damage,
except as a scare tactic, because they are brought after the fact.
The CWA can, however, prevent pollution when government
agencies adhere strictly to its requirements.9 Given the current
political climate and frenzy to increase CBM gas production in the
Powder River Basin, strict environmental compliance is not the
norm. '  Furthermore, even when government agencies do issue
permits, water quality is not guaranteed. For example, the
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality issued an NPDES
permit to the drillers discharging pollution onto Swartz's land. °°
If not for Swartz's citizen suit, the CWA violation would not have
been exposed.
The CWA fails in another area as well: it protects only
surface water, not groundwater. 20 ' Because gas drilling threatens
groundwater with both over-pumping and pollution, the CWA
provides inadequate protection. 20  In the semi-arid Powder River
Basin, depletion of groundwater because of CBM drilling presents
a serious problem.0 3
2. The National Environmental Policy Act is Good, but Not
Good Enough
NEPA also provides Powder River Basin residents with some
protection from the impacts of gas drilling.0 4 In Wyoming, for
instance, the Pennaco court forced the BLM to perform further
studies on CBM drilling's groundwater impacts before auctioning
gas leases.0 0 As Pennaco demonstrated, NEPA fills a gap left by
the CWA; its breadth allows plaintiffs to file claims regarding the
over-pumping of groundwater. 0
NEPA, however, does not guarantee that federal agencies
will protect groundwater. In Montana, for example, the BLM
197. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
198. Cf Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 1239, 1262-63 (D. Wyo. 2002) (noting that
if the agency had followed the CWA, Swartz's land would not have been polluted).
199. See id. at 1248 (explaining that Swartz could not irrigate his crops because
of pollution).
200. Id. at 1247.
201. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (describing how Pennaco
and Wyo. Outdoor Council used NEPA to protect the environment).
205. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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decided not to consider groundwater effects before permitting new
CBM wells.2 0 7 NEPA does not explicitly require that any agency
maintain groundwater levels, set maximum pumping standards,
or even mention groundwater.2°" NEPA defers to government
agencies (in this case the BLM) by requiring agencies to take a
"hard look" at the environmental issue in question, and prepare an
EIS when necessary. 29 Even if the agency prepared an EIS
stating that CBM drilling severely threatened groundwater, it
could proceed to auction gas leases and permit wells freely. 10
Through its procedural focus NEPA brings the public into the
environmental review process and requires agencies to make
considered decisions, but it does not provide substantive
environmental protection.211 In other words, NEPA improves
agency decision-making, but does not guarantee protection of
groundwater. 12 Gas drillers desperately want the water, and
government agencies have been giving it to them. When one
places high value on groundwater protection, NEPA alone is not
enough.
Finally, standing requirements limit citizens' abilities to file
claims to protect their resources under both CWA and NEPA. 1 3
While all Montana and Wyoming residents (even future residents)
have an interest in healthy groundwater levels, few have actual
standing to sue. 14
3. FOIA Presents a Good Option for Non-Profit Groups to
Protect Average Citizens, but Not for Average Citizens to
Protect Themselves
The fact that non-profit groups used FOIA to protect the
Powder River Basin from CBM drilling signals that statutory
protection of Powder River Basin residents, and their water rights,
is insufficient. In one way, this litigation sought to root out the
problem, namely an administration that promotes CBM drilling
over the welfare of Montana and Wyoming residents.2 11 In another
207. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
210. Coggins & Van Dyke, supra note 29, at 650.
211. Id. at 649-50.
212. See supra notes 47-52 (explaining the poor prognosis for groundwater in the
Basin).
213. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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sense, this litigation did not address the substantive issues raised
by CBM drilling in the Powder River Basin, such as water
pollution and groundwater depletion. 216  Furthermore, FOIA
presents a valid option for legal redress only when a public official
fails to administer his or her duties ethically." 7 Residents of the
Basin should not have to wait for such an opportunity to protect
their rights.
4. Current Environmental Protection is Too Responsive to
Political Pressure
NEPA, the CWA, and FOJA all serve a necessary purpose in
the environmental review/landowner protection process. In both
Montana and Wyoming the courts have limited pollution of surface
waters through the CWA, and the Penneco court required the BLM
to perform rigorous environmental review through NEPA.
However, these statutes cannot fully protect groundwater from
CBM development.
As they currently exist, NEPA and the CWA cannot
guarantee protection of the Powder River Basin's groundwater
when the executive branch exerts pressure on agencies to increase
resource development." 8 As the mineral-leasing program exploded
in the past few years, the environmental review process for oil and
gas drilling projects deteriorated. 29  This deterioration did not
result from a new national energy policy, amendments to the CWA
or NEPA, or any other transparent government process."' Rather,
the executive branch simply formed new energy-related
committees, clarified domestic energy production priorities, and
placed pressure on government agencies to comply with those
priorities.22" ' Government agencies responded to this pressure by
issuing gas and oil permits at an accelerated rate and by giving
less time to environmental review.222 The fact that the Bush
administration could simply influence agency operations to
increase permitting in the Powder River Basin reveals a serious
flaw in the environmental review process.
216. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
217. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2004).
218. See supra Part I.B-C (explaining the push to develop CBM and the
environmental consequences).
219. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part I.B.
222. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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NEPA, in particular, has proven to be overly responsive to
political pressure in that it dictates environmental review
procedure.. but does not guarantee substantive protection of any
natural resources.224 In Montana and Wyoming, the BLM or
similar agencies, can fully comply with NEPA while allowing CBM
225
operators to drain groundwater at an inappropriate pace.
Because environmental review procedure has not prevented
groundwater depletion, Montana and Wyoming should adopt laws
that require substantive protection of groundwater.
C. Surface Owners Need Legislation that Will Protect
Groundwater
1. The Public Trust Doctrine Provides a Good Solution to
Resource Allocation Problems
The Hawaii formulation of the public trust doctrine strikes a
sustainable balance between resource development and
conservation because it prescribes a "controlled development of
resources."2 6 Resource development would be controlled under
Hawaii's model because the model allows resource exploitation
only when it is compatible with "public use, access, and
enjoyment."21
Basing water allocation decisions on instream flow standards
will enable Hawaii to maximize the amount of Water available for
permits without compromising stream integrity.2 8 Setting and
following instream flow standards should be relatively simple
because the process requires only that the Commission find out
how much water is available and how much of that water should
be made available for offstream uses. 2 9 Hawaii's clearly outlined
water use priorities should further simplify the Commission's
permitting decisions. Following the Waihole court's stated
priorities should ensure a healthy stream and sufficient water for
drinking and Native uses, before any other uses will be allowed.2 30
223. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
224. See Coggins & Van Dyke, supra note 29, at 649-50.
225. See id. at 650-51.
226. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw.
2000) (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973)).
227. Id. at 454.
228. Id at 461 (explaining that without instream flow standards permitting
would be unplanned and driven by immediate demand).
229. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
230. See Ede, supra note 140, at 295 (outlining the court's priorities).
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Instream flow standards coupled with clear priorities should
provide a workable solution to Hawaii's resource allocation
dilemma.
The public trust doctrine however generates some difficulties.
It will not be easy for the Commission to carry out the Waiahole
decision because of uncertainty over setting instream flow
standards.23' It will be difficult to set instream flow standards
given that no one measured stream depths before the Waiahole
Ditch System construction." 2 In fact, few people living in Hawaii
today have ever seen stream levels that were not compromised by
the ditch system.233 This uncertainty will make it more difficult to
know how much water is necessary to maintain a healthy stream
and how much water can be granted for drinking, Native uses, and
agriculture. 4 The Commission resolved this problem by setting
higher instream flow standards than might be necessary in order
to preserve the ecosystem.2 5
The Waiahole court's version of the public trust doctrine also
generates a problem for farmers or others who want water but do
not qualify for permits. There is no way to soften the blow for
farmers who will not be able to irrigate their crops to the extent
they would like. The Commission's application of the public trust
doctrine will force people to reevaluate their business choices and
actual water needs.236 If enough water permits are not available, it
simply will not be feasible to build a water-intensive business in
Oahu's dry central plain, such as a golf course.3 Regardless of
this problem, the entire population will benefit from sustainable
use of Oahu's water resources because the water will support a
unique ecosystem and will continue to provide water, albeit a
limited amount, for generations to come.
231. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
232. See Ede, supra note 140, at 299-300.
233. A majority of the Waihole Ditch System was constructed from 1913-1916.
Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 423.
234. See Ede, supra note 140, at 299-300.
235. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 466-67 (describing that the instream flow standards
included a buffer).
236. See generally id. at 409-521 (interpreting the public trust doctrine in a way
that places a higher value on conserving water than granting water use permits).
237. See id. at 485-86.
238. See id. at 458 (discussing the Commission's view that instream flow
standards will improve the environment).
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2. The Public Trust Doctrine Would Provide a Good Solution
for the Powder River Basin's Water Allocation Problems
A statute grounded in the public trust doctrine that
prescribes minimum instream flow standards would work to
preserve water in the Powder River Basin for current and future
generations. In many ways the Powder River Basin dilemma is
similar to the problem in Oahu; both regions are struggling with
water conservation and allocation issues."' The public trust
doctrine provided a good solution for Oahu, and it could work
equally as well in the Powder River Basin.
For practical reasons, the public trust doctrine, as formulated
by the Waiahole court, would ensure water conservation
anywhere. 4 ' Maintaining minimum stream flows would help to
maintain groundwater supplies, since a large component of stream
flow comes from groundwater.24 ' Consequently, healthy stream
flow measurements reflect a good supply of groundwater. Besides
setting the minimum stream flow, the statute would also need to
rank possible water uses in order of priority. Hawaii's ranking
provides a useful guideline.42 ' Application of the public trust
doctrine would require government agencies to maintain a
minimum stream flow in order to ensure the continued flow of
streams. 4" Drinking water would be the second highest priority,
then perhaps stock-watering and agricultural uses, and, finally,
industrial uses such as mine dewatering. Unlike Oahu, Montana
and Wyoming would not face as much difficulty selecting
appropriate instream flow standards because they already have a
better record of stream flow measurements than Oahu ever had.44
Therefore, it would be easier to establish minimum instream flow
standards for the Basin than for Oahu, and it would be simpler to
grant permits confidently, in accordance with the public trust
doctrine. 4 '
239. See supra Part I.C and I.E.
240. The Powder River Basin could incorporate the terms of successful damage
agreements into statutory protection for the entire basin. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text (noting that Ted Turner has successfully protected his land
from environmental damage with a well-planned damage agreement).
241. See, e.g., Waiahole, P.3d at 447 (quoting Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656
P.2d 57, 71-72 (1982)) (describing ground and surface water as a "single integrated
source of water").
242. See Ede, supra note 140 (outlining the goals of Hawaii's public trust
doctrine).
243. See id.
244. See supra note 162 (explaining that stream flow standards are available for
most watersheds and that Hawaii's lack of standards is an anomaly).
245. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing a limitation in
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The statute would need to prescribe a remedy if stream flow
fell below a minimum standard.246  In this event, the affected
region should place a moratorium on the least important water
uses. Therefore, if the region's streams dropped below minimum
standards, indicating a possible groundwater shortage, industrial
uses would need to cease.247 This provision might prove to be
useful during the late summer and fall when the region is
particularly dry and streams disappear altogether.
This type of statute strikes a balance between private
industrial and public uses of water. Although CBM drilling would
be the first use cut in times of shortage, CBM drilling would not be
prohibited entirely.248 This proposal would force CBM drilling to
fit into a sustainable ecosystem, which it presently is not doing.249
In addition, the proposal would privilege ranchers who currently
face water shortages because of CBM drilling, hopefully sustaining
Western ranching in a more comfortable fashion.
Legally, such a statute modeled after the public trust
doctrine would provide several advantages. Unlike NEPA and the
CWA, the proposed statute would force CBM drillers to practice
sustainable use of water. ' Furthermore, a statute that clearly
established the rights of parties would offer private citizens an
opportunity to take a case to court without relying on the
ephemeral citizen suit provisions.' CBM drillers would always
need to comply with the statute.
Moreover, this statute would avoid problems with causation,
such as CBM drillers claiming that it is impossible to tell if they
caused the water shortage.252 By simply proscribing CBM drilling
during low flow periods, the CBM drillers would not have the
implementing minimum stream standards in Hawaii's situation that would not
apply in the Powder River Basin).
246. Because stream flow provides a measure of groundwater, it is important to
maintain a minimum stream flow. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
248. See In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 480-82
(Haw. 2000) (explaining that the Commission's designation of "nonagricultural"
water uses means that those uses are subject to greater review when competition
for water arises).
249. See supra notes 46-59 (describing CBM mining's current deleterious effects
on land and water).
250. See supra notes 75-77, 121, 249 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 78-79 and 125 and accompanying text (describing the
limited role of the citizen suit).
252. Because no particular well can be identified as the culprit for water
shortages, it would be difficult to prove who specifically caused the problem. Cf
Arthur et al., supra note 48, at 18 ("Water wells adjacent to but outside of a
producing CBM field may also be adversely impacted.").
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opportunity to raise such a defense. The statute would not allow
industry to shield itself from responsibility for groundwater
depletion because it would remove causation from the equation.
There is one problem with such a statute: who would enact
it? Montana, Wyoming, both states, or the federal government
could enact such a statute.2 53 Because the Powder River Basin
straddles the Wyoming/Montana border, it would be important
that both states or the federal government enact the law.254 If only
one state passed such a statute, it may even not benefit from its
own self-discipline because groundwater does not respect political
boundaries. 2"5 Aquifers overlap the Montana and Wyoming border,
and one state's activities impact the groundwater used by the
other.256 Therefore, the two states should enter into a legally
binding agreement that governs groundwater management or the
federal government should enact the statute. Perhaps the states
could create a Powder River Basin Groundwater District with a
single set of rules that apply to the entire watershed.
Conclusion
This Article has examined the case law surrounding CBM
development in the Powder River Basin, bringing to light both
positive and negative aspects of current environmental protection.
In some instances, the law has worked to ensure protection of the
people and environment, such as in Pennaco where the court
forced the BLM to perform a more thorough EIS before auctioning
several gas leases. In both states, judicial application of the CWA
limited the ability of gas drillers to pollute surface water. Despite
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10 (making no grant or denial of a state or federal
power to enact a public trust statute); U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.").
254. The depletion of groundwater in one state will affect the other, so, in order
to gain maximum benefit from new statutory protection, the statute needs to affect
both states. See supra notes 48-52, 252 and accompanying text (explaining the
extent of potential groundwater depletion and the regional impact of CBM water
production).
255. See supra note 254 and accompanying text
256. See Part I.D. Montana and Wyoming have responded to CBM drilling
asymmetrically. Compare Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 377
F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding previous environmental reviews of CBM
development were insufficient) with N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (D. Mont. 2003) (stating the BLM "was
not required to perform a new EIS prior to issuing the oil and gas leases nor was it
required to halt issuance of leases pending completion"). The Wyoming courts have
been harder on gas drillers than have Montana courts for a variety of reasons. See
supra notes 62-65.
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these successes, groundwater is not adequately protected,
demonstrating the need for better statutory protection. An
underlying problem with CBM development is that the
environmental statutes have proven to be too responsive to
political pressure. Amidst the current push to develop domestic oil
and gas, environmental review has weakened.
Using the public trust doctrine as protection for
environmental issues, such as CBM development, is attractive
because it sets clear priorities that place value on water
conservation and human well-being. Making these values
enforceable through law likely would result in a more controlled
development of resources, benefiting the Western environment
and the people tied to it.

